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1 Introduction 
The notion of ratioflal ageflC'y was proposed by Russell [9] as an allernative characterizalÍon 01' ;n-
telligeflce ageflcy. Loosely speaking, an agenl is said to be ralÍonal if it perfol1ns the right actions 
according to the information it possesses and the goals it wants to achieve. Unfortunately, the enterprise 
of constlUcting a rational agent is a ralher complex task. Allhough in the lasl few years there has been 
an intense tlowering of interest in the subject, it is still in its early beginnings: several issues rcmain 
ovcrlooked or addressed under too unrealistic assumptions. 
As slated by Pollock. f5], a rational agent should have models of itsclf and its surroundings, since it 
must be able to draw conclusions from this knowledge that compose its sel of beJiefs. Traditional 
approaches rely on multi-modal logics lo represent the agent's epistemic state [7. lJ. Given the 
expressive power of thcse fOllnalisms, their use yields proper theoretical models. Ncvcrthclcss, thc 
advantages of these specifications lend to be lost in the transition towards practical systems: lherc is ¡¡ 
tcnuous relalÍon hctween the implementations based on these logics and their theoretical foundations l8J. 
Modal logics systcms suffer from a number of drawbacks, notably the well-known logical omni-
science problem [lOJ. This problem arises as a by-product of the necessÍlation lUle and the K axiom. 
present in any normal modal system. Together, these lUIes imply two unrealistic conditions: an agent 
using this system must know al! the valid formulas, and its beliefs should be closed under logical con-
sClJuence. These properties are overstrong for a resource-bounded reasoner lo achieve them. Therefore, 
lhe tl'adilional modal logic approach is not suitable fol' representing practical believers 111 J. 
We intend lo use logic programs as an altemative representation for the agenes epistemic slatc. This 
formalizalÍon avoids the aforcmentioncd problcms of modal logics, and admits a seamlcss transition 
between theory and practice. In the next section we dctail our model and highlight its advantagcs. 
Next, sectiol1 3 prescnts sume conclusions and reports on the forthcoming work. 
2 Our proposal 
Using logic programs 1.0 describe the agent's knowlcdgc was previously addressed by PercÍl'a el. al. 
in 141. In this setting, an agcnt is defined as a logic program extended with explicit negation, and its 
beliefs are set by the well-founded scmantics of this programo The weakness of this approach is that 
extended logic programming (ELP) does not constitute an appropriate fonnalism lo accomplish this 
task. ELP can represent an interesting class of nonmonotonic knowledge bases in a rather simple way, 
but it cannot deal with partial and potentially contradictory information [3], an csscntial capability in 
practical agcnts. To solve this, a more expressive system is required. 
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Defeasible Logic PlVgramming (DeLP) [2] is a newly developed fOl1nalism that combines the 
advantages of logic programming with deJeasible argumentatiofl. In DeLP an argumentation system is 
used for deciding between contradictory goal s, through a dialectical ana/ysi,\'. Intuitively, an al'gumenl 
is a mini mal set of rules supporting its conclusion. To allswer a query q with respect to él certain 
defeasible logic program, arguments for and against q are fOlmed in order to find ajustification; that is, 
an argument that defeats all of its counterarguments. Since defeatears are also ~u·guments, defcaters for 
the defeaters may exists. In consequence, it is necessw·y to define a dialectical analysis thal establishes 
the status of an w·gument. Based on this analysis, a query q can obtain one of the following answers: 
• yes: there exists eL justified a.rgumcnl ror q. 
• no: no argument for q is ultimately acccpled. 
• undecided: there are w·gumcnts of equal su·cngth for and against q. 
• unknown: no argument can be built that supporL'i q. 
Dcscribing an agenCs epistemic state by mean s of DeLP is a promising solution, since it providcs a 
good trade-off between expressivity and implementability. In our proposal, a defeasible logic plVgram 
models the agent's knowledge, and thc bclicf set is composcd by the quedes answcrcd in a positivc 
fashion with respcct lo lhis programo 
The main advantagc of this stancc is lhat any agent based on DeLP inherit its ability to handlc 
conflicting infOlmation. On the conlrw·y, when using an extended logie program, additional mechanisms 
lo enforce consistency must be specilicd. Particularly, in l4J contradictions are associaled with integrily 
consU·aints that denote incompatible pieccs of knowledge. If one of thesc rules is U·iggcred, a revision 
procedure is started, whose objcctivc is to find an stable model for the extended logic program by 
eliminating sorne of thc conflicting belicfs. To do this, a prcfcrence relation between minimal nOI1-
contradictory models must bc defined. Howcver, designing suitable revision criteria is slill an open 
problem. 
Furthennore, there is a fundamental question regarding the esscnce 01' revision. The climination of 
a certain bclicf withdraws infOlmatiol1 from the system. Suppose that a and b w·e conflicting beliefs, 
and the revision criterion chooses to remove b in order to restore consistellcy. Next, the systcm finds 
that a and a new belief e w·c in conflict, and decides to drop a from its knowledge base. With a 
defeated by e to continue in disbelieving b is unsoulld, but since it was previously removed it cannol 
be rcinstated. 
This situation is an unintended consequcllce 01' the revision process. We believc that any mechallism 
to en force consistency cntangles the framework, and may have unforeseen consequences (as shown by 
lhc previous example). These problems can be avoidcd using a fi.mnalism like DeLP, wherc thcre is 
no Ileed to specify consU·ainl rulcs or revision procedures. 
3 Work in progress 
We havc ouúined the intuitions supporting a promising fOlmalization for the design of rational agents, 
lhat helps lo minimize the existing gap between the formal theory and its practical implemelltation. This 
is only the beginning: somc reseru·ch is bcing conducted ()n defilling an agent w·chitecture according 
to the proposed ideas. This w·chitecture must bc ablc to accommodate aH 01' lhe fcatures required by a 
rational agent. 
As remarked by PoHock [6], an agent able to interact in a complex dynamic environmenl cannot 
be provided with aH lhe necessw·y infOlmalion from its conception. In this situalion, a mechanism 
lo pcrccivc and incorporate changes becomes imperative. As a result., we are extending our theory to 
supply the agent with percepLion capabilities. 
InfOlmation altitudes are related to the knowledge an agent has about the world, whereas pro-
altitudes ru·c those that in sorne way guide lhe agcnts actíons. As pointed out by Wooldridgc and 
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Jennings [11J, a rational agent must be represenled in lelms of at least une information attitude and one 
pro-altitude, since it will make choices and fOlmulate intcntions bascd on the infolmalion it possess. 
Fur this reason, both of them are necded lo direct the agent's behavior. So far we have only considcred 
beliefs and knowJedge, without taking into accounl pro-attitudes, Iike desires and intenlÍons 17, 11 
whuse role in the desit:,'11 01' rational agenls has been acknowledged in the philosophical and artilicial 
intclligence literalure. Consequently, our model has to be extended to reckon with this pro-attitudes. 
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